Mangerial Idiosyncrasies And Corporate Capital Structure

Coming back for his second appearance, our guest blogger this week is Dr. Harry DeAngelo, the Kenneth King Stonier Chair in Business Administration at the Marshall School of Business at USC. Dr. DeAngelo is a noted expert on payout policy, capital structure, and corporate governance. Here, Dr. DeAngelo discusses how transitory debt can affect the capital structure decision. For a more detailed analysis, you can read the entire paper "Capital Structure Dynamics and Capital Structure" here. 

Corporate capital structures generally show a remarkable degree of variation over time.  One under-appreciated source of variation is the unique personal views about appropriate financial policies held by the people running a firm.  There is scope for managers’ idiosyncratic preferences to have a significant influence on the debt-equity mix when taxes and financial distress costs have only a second-order impact on firm value over a reasonably wide range of leverage ratios. 

Coca-Cola’s dramatic shift in capital structure in the 1980s (detailed below) provides a useful illustration of how the idiosyncratic views of top management can radically reshape financial policy.  The Coca-Cola case also highlights how debt can serve as a transitory vehicle for funding investment opportunities.  For more on the latter view, see my previous post.

  

Coca-Cola’s “levering up” of the 1980s: The appointment of Roberto Goizueta as CEO in 1980 marked a sharp shift in Coca-Cola’s financial policies toward more aggressive use of debt, including a willingness to borrow to make acquisitions (e.g., to acquire Columbia Pictures in 1982).  The CEO’s letter to shareholders in the 1985 annual report spelled out the firm’s new financial principles: “In the financial arena, The Coca-Cola Company is pursuing a more aggressive policy.  We are using greater financial leverage whenever strategic investment opportunities are available.  We are reinvesting a larger portion of our earnings by increasing dividends at a lesser rate than earnings per share growth….And, we are continuing to repurchase our common shares when excess cash or debt capacity exceed near-term investment requirements.”  In a 1984 interview, the firm’s CFO stated “We can go up to $1 billion without hurting our triple-A rating, and we would not hesitate to do so if something unusual comes along….” and “we will not hesitate to be a double-A company.  I want to make that very clear.”  The firm did, in fact, lose its triple-A rating because of its more aggressive use of debt. 

The Coca-Cola case study is from “How Stable Are Corporate Capital Structures?” by Harry DeAngelo and Richard Roll, which is forthcoming in the Journal of Finance.  The case appears in the paper’s Internet Appendix, which also contains case studies of 23 other firms that, like Coca-Cola, were (i) in the Dow Jones Industrial Average at some point, and that were (ii) publicly held from before the Great Depression until at least 2000.